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never know it vanished into the Unknowable ReaHty
behind all phenomena, etc., etc.," is wholly without
warrant in the language of Mr. Fiske and is a manifest
It was the mental comdistortion of his thought.
mentary, doubtless, of Mr. Wakeman as he listened
the product of his own vivid imaginato the lecture,
but it has not the
tion and strong positivistic bias
:

—

;

most remote warrant

in

the terms used by the lecturer.

COURT.

must never forget that

all

our scientific inquiries deal

with certain sides of reality only." ("Fundamental
Problems," p. 348.) It therefore appears that all men-

and physical processes are disparate abstractions

tal

or symbolical interpretations in terms of conscious-

ness of certain processes which constitute or apper-

nature of which

tain to a Reality the

revealed to us.

For

if

is

not otherwise

otherwise revealed, how other-

Save material

and thought

The comments of Dr. Carus in so far as they are based
upon Mr. Wakeman's unauthorised interjection into

wise?

the argument of Mr. Fiske are of course irrelevant,
save as protests against the ghostly philosophical

conscious apprehension and investigation

Wakeman's vivid imagination. As a
"spook" raiser Mr. Wakeman has few or no equals.
The phrase "with which it is concentric," which we

sj'mbolical and disparate processes constitute the whole

creation of Mr.

have

italicised, indicates clearly that

Mr. Fiske's rhe-

and constant relationship between the psychic and physical processes,
though not one of quantitative equivalence.
As to the nature of the relations between the psychic
states and the corresponding physical processes, therefore, there does not thus far appear to be any substantial difference between the Spencerian agnostic and
Dr. Carus. Speaking of feeling and motion elsewhere.
"The abstract conceptions form
Dr. Carus declares
two parallel systems." ("Fundamental Problems,"
torical figure implied a definite

:

He

p. 338.)

again asserts: "All our concepts, mat-

and mind included, are only symbols to represent
certain features abstracted from the fact of experience.
mere
Ota- abstract concepts are not realities, but ideas
noumena, things of thought, invented for the sole purTo declare that force
pose of comprehension
and feeling, and consciousness and thought are material does not prove the boldness of free-thought, it
betrays an immature mind
Matter, force, mind,
spirit, form, feeling, are mere abstractions.
To look
upon any of these .... as something else than terms
or symbols, to look upon them as omneities or allcomprehension realities, is a self-mystification."
All this, as we understand it, admirably expresses
the idea of Mr. Spencer.
The essentially disparate
conceptions of material processes and psychical states,
and the essentially symbolical character of each, are

ter

;

'

'

familiar thoughts to the student of the synthetic phi-

losophy.

We

are brought back, then, to the consideration of

which these processes and
states are disparate mental symbols.
That there is
such a Reality is agreed both by the objective monist
and the philosophical agnostic. Completing a sentence already quoted in part, Dr. Carus says: "The
abstract conceptions form two parallel systems, but the
the nature of the Reality of

real thing can be represented as parallel only in the sense

that
in

it is

parallel to itself."

And he

terms which no Spencerian

will

further declares,

contravene

:

"We

processes

pro-

cesses what can possibly constitute the object of our

Does any

?

conceivable synthesis or commingling of these two
of Reality?
scientific

Manifestl}', not.

Confessedly not, in a

sense; for Dr. Carus admits that "all our

with certain sides of reality

scientific inquiries deal

Logically not: for no synthesis of disparate

only."

symbols can possibly constitute a complete knowledge
Actually not for it is impossible
Being.
form a concept of such a synthetised symbol in

of unified

to

:

thought.

We

have looked

vain through the accessible

in

writings of Dr. Carus for any adequate definition or

description of the innermost nature of the monistic
Reality of which mental and physical processes are,

by his own
ical

and symbol-

explicit admission, disparate

representations in consciousness.

We

deed, such formal definitions as "Reality

is

find, in-

the

sum

can become, objects
of experience" ("Fundamental Problems," p. 254),
but this is a definition which does not define it amounts
to no more than saying "Reality is everything," and
total of all the facts that are, or

;

gives us no information as to

its intrinsic

nature.

It

even helps to befog the subject rather than to enlighten it for if mental and material processes are not
"realities,"* as he assures us, how can "realities "become objects of experience at all ? Our experience is
transformed in consciousness to a knowledge of these
symbolical processes
and such knowledge would
therefore appear to be the whole subject-matter of our
;

;

conscious experience.

The philosophical agnostic does not seek for any
such definition of the essential nature of Reality. He
recognises and confesses the futility of such search.
The same psychological principle which compels the
confession that

mind and matter

are mental abstrac-

tions or disparate thought symbols

of

this

Reality,

proves to him that it can only be known indirectly, by
and through the interpretation of these symbols. What
it is in its innermost constitution can never be revealed
to a finite being.

Such

Reality symbolically, as
*

[This

corrected

is a

know this
own limited

being can only
related to his

misstatement of my position, which for brevity's sake may be
Mental as well as material processes, in my opinion, are
realities if considered by themselves as abstract ideas-

at once.

They are no
—Editor,]
realities.

a

it is

—

THB OPRN COURT.
psj'chical faculties.

This s3'mbolism constitutes the

And

very nature o£ our knowledge.
of this fact

is

the recognition

the irrefragable foundation of philosoph-

agnosticism.

ical

The philosophical agnostic may consistently deny,
with Dr. Cams, that "legitimate problems exist that
are insolvable"; but the question of the intimate na-

ture and constitution of Reality
legitimate problem for the

not,

is

human

he claims, a

intellect, since

its

data are wholly out of relation with that intellect. All

problems involved in the study of mental and material processes, on the contrary, are strictly legitimate,
and such problems are undoubtedly solvable. In these
regions of investigation there

may be

a vast

unknown,

no "unknowable." *
Dr. Carus tells us that "unknowability is not a
quality inherent in things."
To afBrm the contrary
would be to posit an absurdity of which neither Mr.
Spencer nor any of his intelligent expositors are
but there

is

—

Manifestly, the ability or non-ability to

guilty.
is

a quality of minds, not of things.

tion of mental capacity

It is

know

the limita-

which renders Reality,

in its

essential constitution, unknowable, not the nature of

immanent

The
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philosophical agnostic cannot agree with the

objective monist that the incomprehensible
sarily the non-existent.

If

is

neces-

the "incomprehensibility"

were in the nature of Reality, then indeed this might
not be an unreasonable assumption, though a dogmatic assumption it would be in any case, not a demonstrable fact. But since that which renders Reality incomprehensible is the finite and arbitrary limitations of man's psj'chic nature, the determination of the
truth that Being or Reality, in its essential constitution, is unknowable, is a simple logical deduction from
the proven facts of psychological science. There is no
"mystery" or "metaphysics" or "supernaturalism "
involved in

it

whatever.

Dr. Carus informs us dogmatically that

"A

tran-

scendent existence that exists by itself without exhibiting any effects is no existence. It is an impossibility.
is a mere phrase without any
meaning, not realisable in thought." Inasmuch as no
one at least, no Spencerian agnostic assumes an
existence " that exists by itself without exhibiting any

Existence without effects

—

—

effects,"

we may pass by the dogmatic character
AH that appears in consciousness

of

immanent presence and potency

of

the statement.

is

Things or processes are
knowable under the conditions b}' which they are relatable to the psychic nature, and are thus capable of
responding to its prescient interrogations. In so far as

the effect of the

they are not so related, they are, to the possessors of

It is claimed, however, that these effects are not competent to reveal to the consciousness of finite beings

that

finite

constitution-.

psychical natures, unknowable.

If,

therefore, as Dr. Carus assures us, "Reality

is.

And parts of reality
undivided and indivisible.
[only] are symbolised in words " ("Fundamental Prob-

It

is

lems,"

p. 300), will

he not kindly define for us the

in-

whole ? The editor
The Open Court is an acute thinker, and a master
He has
of clear and intelligible forms of expression.
lucidly defined the nature of mental and material processes.
If, as he has repeatedly asserted, the incomprehensible is the non-existent, will he not render
comprehensible, in clear and definite terms of the
known, the nature of the one reality? Without such
a clear definition which shall at once explain Reality,
and differentiate it from those verbal and symbolical
abstractions known as "mind," "matter," "force,"
"motion," etc., the word "reality" is no more intelligible as a designation than is the word "unknowable."
It is equally a term used to veil or expound
trinsic nature of this Reality as a

of

our ignorance.
* It is strange that the critics of philosophical agnosticism should understand the advocates of that doctrine to assert that Reality /tfr« is unknowable,
since to do so would constitute the complete negation of their own philosophy.
It would affirm a knowledge of the nature of Reality which their philosophy

expressly disclaims.
as follows
1.

Expressed

syllogistically, the

argument would proceed

the intrinsic nature of Reality.

Nor can

the philosophical agnostic admit that "ab-

Science assures him
was evolved long before any
individualised form of consciousness had an existence.
Being could then have had no "manifestation,"* un-

solute existence

is

impossible. "

that the material world

less

we conceive

of the

Universe

psychic self-consciousness.

To

itself

as possessing a

assert that Reality can

have no existence apart from manifestation in anj'
other sense is pure idealism.
Neither Mr. Spencer nor any other advocate of
philosophical agnosticism asserts that Reality

knowable per

se,

is

un-

or in any other sense than the one

heretofore indicated.

On

the contrary, that

immanent

it is

known

and nexus of
all those disparate symbolical abstractions which are
included in mental and material processes, is affirmed
fundamenas knowledge of the highest assured verity
Should man develop
tal to all our other knowledge.
as existing, as the

source,

life

—

* (This is a misconception of my position.
Manifestation has been explained in Fundamental Problems as '* the effectiveness of things in their relations." The term manifestation is often, perhaps mostly, used in the sense of
becoming manifest to some sentient or thinking being. At the time when I
used the expression, I gave the following explanation in No. 121 of The Open
" Existence is real by manifesting itself somehow. It
Court, Dec. 19th 1S89
:

:

Finite

real existence.
It is admitted that Reality, to beings
possessed of psychic self-consciousness, always exhibits effects which are symbolically reflected therein.

minds cannot know the nature

of Reality.

2. The human mind is finite.
3. Hence, the human mind kntyws that Reality per se
The third term is evidently a non seguitur

is

unknowablel

need not manifest itself to me, A pebble on the surface of the moon which perhaps no living creature has ever seen, manifests its existence by a pressure
upon the moon, a reflection of sunbeams, and in innumerable other ways."
Editor.]

"

THE OPEN
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more and acuter faculties of sense-perception, new and
modes of psychical abstraction and synthesis,
this Reality would be related to him in ways of which
he can now form no conception. The term " matter"

finer

might, in such a not inconceivable event, cease to
adequately represent his symbolical interpretation of
its objective relations to his consciousness.

Not, however, until he shall cease utterly to be a
being, not until all limitations to his modes of
sense-perception shall be wholly abrogated, not until
he shall become in fact omnipresent and omniscient,
finite

can he ever
through, in

know

the ultimate Reality through and

know

its full

He

essential constitution.

cannot

otherwise than relatively, by means of ab-

it

and thought-symbols determined by his own

stractions

psychical nature, and responding to its finite limitaThe unknowability of Reality in its immanent
tions.
is a logical and inexpugnable corollary
from the admitted truth that the psychical nature of
man is finite and limited.

constitution

AGNOSTICISM IN "THE MONIST

"

BY ELLIS THURTELL.

The pages

volume

of the first

of

The Monist con-

tain several criticisms of Agnosticism, as understood

by Dr. Paul Carus, that are of great interest and imDr. Carus seems bent on demonstrating
that however anxious any Agnostic may be to take
rank among the Positive Monists, he can by no means
portance.

consistently do so without forfeiting his right to the
title of

Agnostic. Well,

I

for

one should be very sorry

to think that this conclusion is the inevitable result of

on the matter. And when so
competent a reasoner as Dr. Carus assures us that it

really clear cogitation

is

— despite

my own

conviction to the contrary

—

I

am

glad to harbor the hope that our difference of opinion
may after all arise rather from explainable distinctions
of

definition than

from inherent incompatibility

of

ideas.

To

start with, in the first

are told

"The

:

number

of

The Monist ^nq

negative features of Descartes's phi-

" losophy naturally found their ultimate completion
"in Agnosticism. The assumption of the existence

"of a subject led to the doctrine that this subject is
" unknowable." Now I am in entire agreement with Dr.
" Carus following Kant in holding that " Descartes's

—

—

"famous syllogism

sum" must be held to
supposed to prove the
a subject apart from thought and

Cogito ergo

contain a fallacy, so far as
positive existence of
feeling.

it

is

Indeed that the state

of

consciousness ex-

pressed by the verb Cogito does not necessarily imply
anything underlying itself still less that this under;

lying something

unknowable.
Again we read: "The assumption
"that underlies the acts of thought leads
is

of

something
assump-

to the

'
'

COURT.
tion of

somethmg that

But neither do

I

pin

underlies objective existence.

my

philosophic faith to any such

The walnut table at which I
underlying something.
write is, I am convinced, that very sort of object which
it

seems

to

my

subjective self to be.

cept the dictum

of

Dr.

For

Carus that

I

wholly ac-

"The

data of

knowledge are not mere subjective states, they are reAnd am cerlations between subject and object."
tainly of opinion that whatever different impressions
the table may produce upon different people are due
not to any unknowability of its actual nature, but simply to the differences observed to exist between the
brain and senses of one person and another the subjective factor, namely, that forms one, and one only
"Objectivessential half in every act of knowledge.
" ity," indeed, as Dr. Carus says, "is no chimaera
" and we are very well enabled to establish the truth or

—

;

" untruth of objective facts." Nor can I see anything
my Agnosticism to prohibit my believing that
"the philosophy of the future accordingly will be a

in

"philosophy of facts; it will he positivism : and in so
"far as a unitary systematisation of facts is the aim
"and ideal of all science it will be Monism." The
prince of Agnostics, Herbert Spencer himself has
spoken of the "tacit implication* [in his scheme] that
philosophy is completely unified knowledge"; and
that "unification is possible, and that the end of phi" losophy is the achievement of it."
Now this view of the function of philosophy common as it evidently is to Herbert Spencer and to The
Moiiisfs editor leads us on to what seems to me a
prime misconception of that Spencerian type of AgIn the
nosticism by which, in the main, I hold.
fourth number of The Monist Dr. Carus gravely observes " Agnosticism is in our opinion no sound basis
"upon which to erect ethics." Nor is it in ours, nor
Why inin that of any one else so far as we know.
deed should Agnosticism be brought into the question
"Mr. Herbert Spencer who for some reason
at all?
"or other tried to escape the consequences of his Ag" nosticism in the ethical field," would, I fancy, be

—

—

:

very

much

surprised to hear of this suggested

Dr. Pfleiderer

— in

his

"Development

of

effort.

Theology,"

recently written for an English Library of Philosoph}'

—well

remarks: "The Agnosticism which Spencer
"adopted from Hamilton and Mansel forms but the
" one aspect of his philosophy to a certain extent the
"convenient background into which all metaphysical
"problems can be relegated, so as to construct with
;

"fewer hindrances a system of natural evolution from
" the results of modern science." He goes on to point
out that the idea of Evolution is the mainspring of the
whole matter which Herbert Spencer has to impart.

And

that

"he has placed

the doctrine of the incogni-

* " First Principles," 5th Edition, p. 539.

—

THE OPKN

COURT.
For there

"sability of the Absolute as a wall of separation be-

cism advisedly.

"tween philosophy and

not altogether unfamiliar
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is

a type of Agnosticism

" that is not self-contradictory. It follows that God,
"the Absolute, the Unconditioned is not for us cog"nisable. " So far, in point of fact, and no farther
does Herbert Spencer's Agnosticism extend.- It has

believe to Dr. Carus
which certainly tends to be gnostic where Herbert
Spencer is agnostic, and agnostic (through want of
perfect sympathy with sound science) where Spencer
and all strong psychologists are gnostic. It is not the
Agnosticism in fine of every rhetorical writer upon my
own side that I feel called upon to defend. But that
Agnosticism only which, following (with the slightest
modifications suggested by individual thought) the
profoundly philosophic lead of Herbert Spencer, owes

relation only to the three prevailing theories of ulti-

its

mate Causation

ment suspended

religion that an eternal peace

"may

be concluded between them."
For Herbert Spencer holds, as Dr. Pfleiderer observes "that in every one of the three main [cos" mic] theories Atheism, Pantheism, and Theism is

—

"shown

—

the impossibility of a satisfactory solution

and

simply and solely consists in
the passing of a verdict of " non-proven " against each
and all of these. Atheism, Pantheism, and Theism
:

it

I

existence simply to the scientific principle of judguntil sufficient evidence appears.

In

known.

unknowable, which has hitherto been the great bugbear barrier between modified
Spencerian Agnosticism and the Positive Monism of
The Open Court, is transmuted into the merely actual
unknown. That the recognition of this relative and

— Professor

subjective Unknowability on the part of Agnostics

Huxley has happily enough given the name of Agnosticism.
And though the word is not mentioned in the

could ever have been a line of separation can be believed by no one at all familiar with the writings of
And that all definite Agnosticism has
Dr. Carus.

are formally declared out of court as altogether too

And

dogmatic.

the conclusion

come

to

is,

that about

their several theses nothing can be positively

To

this

conclusion

— however

arrived

at

" First Principles," Herbert Spencer has in his " Ecclesiastical

Institutions," definitely adopted

He may

scriptive of his creed.

Dr. Pfleiderer believes
bility

he posits

is

him

it

as de-

indeed consider, as

to do, that the

unknowa-

not merely relative but absolute.

Here many of us would probably not follow him,
deeming ourselves to be deciding more in accordance
with the evidence by declaring that we do not know

how

may

Herbert Spencer, however, has anticipated some such objection to any assertion of an
unknown that is also absolutely unknowable. In the
last page of his " Ecclesiastical Institutions " he speaks
that

this light the absolutely

seemed

to

him

so essentially antagonistic to his

own

philosophic faith must arise from something of misrepresentation on one side and misconception on the other.

Surely the time has come for this unnecessary and
unfortunate misunderstanding to be removed.

SPENCERIAN AGNOSTICISM.

be.

I.

IN

REPLY TO MR. ELLIS THURTELL.

Mr. Herbert Spencer as a philosopher and as a
thinker is a power in our age, not only because he understands how to deal with deep problems so as to
impress his conception of them upon the reader, but

"that analysis of knowledge which while forcing
him [the Spencerian] to Agnosticism, yet continually
"prompts him to imagine some solution of the great
"enigma which he knows cannot be solved." The

geist of the present generation.

only satisfactory answer to any Agnosticism, whether

the fact that on

show that there
some actual solution of the great enigma. And
this, upon any other than already discredited super-

and The Open Court are in persympathy with the spirit of Mr. Spencer's philosophy, but at the same time I recognise that there are
points not less important in which there is no agreement, and perhaps the most important one is the doc-

of
'

'

absolute or relative, surely must be to
is

been done. Until
done I for one must take leave to declare myself an Agnostic while claiming at the same time,
and without any sense of self-contradiction, to be considered a Positive Monist- -by belief and tendency, if
not b}' any assertion of certainty or completed knowlnaturalistic grounds, has never yet
it

is

I

am

fully

many most important

aware

of

subjects the

tenets of The Monist

fect

trine of agnosticism.

We

should be very glad to learn that Mr. Spencer's
agnosticism was such as Mr. Ellis Thurtell represents
In the light in which he views the subject, "the
it.
absolutely unknowable which has hitherto been the

edge.
Prof.

also because his views strongly coincide with the Zeit-

J.

R. Seeley, in his "Natural Religion," has

remarked that the most embittered war of words is
usually that which is carried on between those whose
Let us hope that
differences consist only in words.
the conflict between Spencerian Agnosticism and
Open Court Monism is not destined to illustrate the
truth of this observation.

I

say Spencerian .^gnosti-

great bugbear barrier between modified Spencerian

Monism of The Open
transmuted into the merely actually un" modified
I am fully in sympathy with this

agnosticism and the Positive
Court,

is

known."

wish that Mr. Spencer
If Mr.
Thurtell's conception of Spencerianism is different from
Spencerian agnosticism," and

had consented

I

to the modification himself.

THE OPEN
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mine,

may

it

arise, as

misconception on

my

Mr. Thurtell suggests, from a
The quesI doubt it.

part, but

by looking up Mr. SpenLet him declare in his own
words whether his idea of the unknowable is merely
relative and not absolute, whether it consists simply
and solely of a verdict of "not proven" with regard
to the several theses of Atheism, Pantheism, and
Theism.*
tion

however

is

easily decided

cer's First Principles.

The

chapter of the First Principles

first

ends with the following sentences

"And

thus the mystery which

out to be a far
pect

—not a

all

" Here, then,

46)

religions recognise, turns

more transcendent mystery than any

relative,

(p.

:

of

them

sus-

but an absolute mystery .\

an ultimate religious truth of the highest possible certainty!!]
a truth in which religions in general are at one
with each other, and with a philosophy antagonistic to their special
dogmas. And this truth, respecting which there is a latent agreement among all mankind from the fetish-worshipper to the most
stoical critic of human creeds, must be the one we seek.
If Religion and Science are to be reconciled, the basis of reconciliation
must be this deepest, widest, and most certain [!] of all facts that
the Power of which the Universe manifests to us is idterly inscrutis

—

—

able.^^ \

This passage, it seems to me, is sufficient to disprove Mr. Thurtell's allegation that I had misconstrued
Mr. Spencer's position.
Mr. Spencer's unknowable
is not merely an unknown, it is a "transcendent mystery" and "utterly inscrutable." And this idea I deem
indeed to be "essentially antagonistic to the faith
of Monistic Positivism."

the

The importance which Mr. Spencer attributes to
Unknowable in his theoretical world-conception

ought

to give

it

a prominent place also in his ethics,

nothing but the practical application of a
Mr. Spender's philosophy is not a unitary

for ethics is

theory.

and consistent system, but an amalgamation
incompatible systems.

A

of several

consistent ethigs of agnosti-

cism would be mysticism, i. e., a theory which holds
that we feel impelled to do our duty without being able
to explain the nature of duty what conscience, justice,
;

known. A conphilosophy of evolution would be

morality, etc., really are can never be
sistent ethics of the

"good

is

that

enhances the process of evolution, bad

is

that

evolutionism,

hinders

it

i.

e.

the proposition

or prepares a dissolution."

which
which
Mr. Spencer

neglects his theories, agnosticism as well as evolutionism, entirely In his ethics, and I cannot help considering this as an inconsistency on Mr. Spencer's part.
J
* By the bye, we do not believe that the propositions of atheism, theism,
and pantheism lie outside the pale of science. The problems of the existence
of God, the personality of God, etc., are not subjects concerning which we can
never come to a detinite conclusion. Indeed they are no longer open questions
to him who has taken the trouble to infoim himself about the present state of
investigation.
t Italics are ours.
X Mr. Spencer's philosophy is lacking in more than one respect in conThis is a truth unknown only to his blind followers, which will appear as soon as anyone attempts to condense his views, Ueberweg, for in-

sistency.

COURT.

Of "the great enigma which the Spencerian knows
cannot be solved," Mr. Thurtell says "there is an actual solution." It has not as yet been found
until it
is found, he says, he for one must take leave to de;

clare himself an

recognises our

agnostic.

own

This agnosticism which

ignorance, the agnosticism of

some previous

mod-

most
which will help us to do away
with our ignorance.
I am far from having objections
to the agnosticism of modesty because, on innumerable
subjects, I shall have to take rank myself among this
class of agnostics.
We have no quarrel with the agnosticism which is simply "the scientific principle of
judgment suspended until sufficient evidence appears."
This settles the point at issue between Mr. Thurtell
and myself. Yet I feel urged to add a few comments
esty as

I

called

recommendable

it

in

articles, is a

attitude,

concerning Mr. Spencer's philosophy.
II.

THE RECONCILIATION OF RELIGION AND SCIENCE ON
THE BASIS OF THE UNKNOWABLE.

Mr. Spencer's reconciliation of Religion and Science
on the basis of the Unknowable appears to us very unsatisfactory
and it will be seen to be impracticable,
because it rests upon erroneous premises. It is not
true that on the one side religion is based upon the
unknown or unknowable, and on the other side that
the ultimate ideas of science are inscrutable and representative of realities that cannot be comprehended.
Religion is everywhere based upon the known and
knowable.
The savage worships the thunderstorm
not because it is something inscrutable to him, but
because he is afraid of it ; he actually knows that it can
do him harm. The obvious danger connected with a
phenomenon makes man anxious to adapt his conduct
to it, so that he will escape unscathed.
If a phenomenon is not sufficiently known in its causes, this will
breed erroneous conceptions or superstitions, and
there is no conciliation possible between the latter and
science. It is true that the facts of nature which have
made man religious were misunderstood by the savage
and most facts are still little understood by the scien;

stance, says in his History of PItilosophy [Translated from the 4th German edition by Geo. S. Morris, p. 432) in a synopsis of Mr. Spencer's views about
matter and mind, which are declared to be unknowable in First Principles
"As to what matter and mind are, he [Mr. Spencer] replies sometimes
" that we can know it, because a being is required to manifest phenomena,
" sometimes because persistence in consciousness supposes correspondence in
"permanent forces, sometimes because the two conceptions are the same,
" sometimes that matter and mind are simply bundles or series of phenomena
" and nothing besides.
Sometimes he reasons as though causality were a di"rect and self-evident relation, and sometimes as though this relation were
" nothing more than an order of sensations and our belief in it were the growth
" of inseparable associations."
Ueberweg sums up liis review of Mr. Spencer in the following paragraph:
"The system of Spencer is still under criticism, and perhaps may not
" have been fully expounded by its author.
Possibly it has not yet been com"pletely developed. Should Spencer continue to devote to philosophy his
" active energies for many years, it is not inconceivable that new associations
" may take possession of that physiological organisation which he is accus" tomed to call himself, and perhaps be evolved under another system of tirst
"principles which may displace those which he taught hitherto."
;

THE OPEN
But

not this lack of comprehension
was then and is now based on
the contrary, religion is based upon the more or less
clearly conceived idea that we have to conform to a
power not ourselves. The conciliation of religion with
tists to-day.

upon which

it is

religion

COURT.

shall

we

have forgotten

;

to science.

proposes a number of conceptions of the terms
space, time, matter, and motion, which are untenable and self- contradictory and then concludes that
all

understanding." Mr. Spencer however
these conceptions that they are mere

abstractions describing certain qualities,

that these

terms represent these qualities, and comprehension is
nothing more or less than a proper and systematic
representation. We know what matter, motion, space

and time

are,

considered as abstractions, although

if

we cannot know what they are in themselves.
But we need not know it, for space, time, matter, and

it is

true

motion do not
in themselves

exist in
;

themselves

;

they are not things

they are simply abstracts representing

certain qualities of reality.

Let us take the term motion as an example.
Spencer says
Here, for instance,

Mr.

is

a ship which, for simplicity's sake,

we

suppose to be anchored at the equator with her head to the
West. When the captain walks from stem to stern, in what direcan answer which
tion does he move ? East is the obvious answer
for the moment may pass without criticism.
But now the anchor
will

—

is

heaved, and the vessel sails to the

West with

a velocity equal to

which the captain walks. In what direction does he now
move when he goes from stem to stern ? You cannot say East, for
that at

the vessel

is

carrying him as fast towards the West as he walks to

and you cannot say West for the converse reason. In
respect to surrounding space he is stationary though to all on
board the ship he seems to be moving. Bat now are we quite sure
When we take into
of this conclusion ?
Is he really stationary ?
account the Earth's motion round its axis, we find that instead of
being stationary he is travelling at the rate of 1000 miles per hour
to the East
so that neither the perception of one who looks at
him, nor the inference of one who allows for the ship's motion, is
anything like the truth. Nor indeed, on further consideration.
the East

;

;

—

;

For we
This

;

How

illusive are

our ideas of Motion,

thus

is

made

sufficiently

manifest. That which seems moving proves to be stationary

;

that

which seems stationary proves to be moving while that which we
conclude to be going rapidly in one direction, turns out to be going
;

much more rapidly in the opposite direction. And so we are taught
that what we are conscious of is not the real motion of any object,
rate or direction

its

Motion
place

is

It

is

a

;

but merely

change

of

relative

is

change

place, but this

not something absolute.

reference point.

motion as measured

its

— either the position we ourselves occupy

from an assigned position
or some other."

It is

nothing

in

of
it-

and can be determined only by

If

we omit

a

this reference point in

our description of a certain motion we shall find ourselves unable to determine either its velocity or its di-

and in this way truly "our ideas
"thus made illusive." To describe

rection
are

without considering

it

motion

of

a

"

relation

as a relation to something,

is

impossible and nonsensical.

Let us take one more instance.

Mr. Spencer says

that "all hypotheses respecting the constitution of

matter commit us to inconceivable conclusions when
logically developed."

know

little

Now

it is

a trite truism that

of the constitution of the elements

we

and there

are innumerable problems of physics and chemistry

unsolved yet and our scientists have no hope to solve
If
these problems within any reasonable time.
this were Mr. Spencer's meaning, we need no agnosall

:

'•'

better.

in its orbit.

follows that, assuming the

it

time to be midday, he is moving, not at the rate of 1000 miles per
hour to the East, but at the rate of 67,000 miles per hour to the
West. Nay, not even now have we discovered the true rate and
the true direction of his movement.
With the Earth's progress in
its orbit, we have to join that of the whole Solar system towards
the constellation Hercules and when we do this, we perceive that
he is moving neither East nor West, but in a line inclined to the
plane of the Ecliptic, and at a velocity greater or less (according
to the time of the year) than that above named.
To which let us
add, that were the dynamic arrangements of our sidereal system
fully known to us, we should probably discover the direction and
rate of his actual movement to differ considerably even from these.

self.

He

all

much

motion

to allow for the Earth's

being some 68,000 miles per hour,

either in

On the one hand religion is not based upon the unknown, and on the other hand, the ultimate scientific
ideas are not incomprehensible. How does Mr. Spencer
arrive at the strange view that these ideas are representative of realities that cannot be comprehended ?

they "pass
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revised conclusion to be

this

;

science, as we understand it, can be brought about only
by a purification of our conception of the power to
which we have to conform. That religion will be the
purest and highest which holds forth the simple statement of provable truth as the basis of ethics and this
religion cannot be in conflict with science, for it is to
be based upon that which we know, and not upon that
which we do not know. If a religion, based upon that
which we do not know, be found to be reconcilable
with science, it will be mere hap-hazard, a matter
of pure chance, and at any rate the principle of such
a religion will under all circumstances be antagonistic

overlooks in

find

ticism to be told so, for the world has
ago.

Yet this

clares that

is

known

that long

not Mr. Spencer's meaning.

"matter

He

de-

in its ultimate nature is as abso-

Space and Time." And
makes with the foredetermined
aim that they should fail and end in contradictions are
upon the whole attempts to think of matter, force, molutely incomprehensible as

the efforts, which he

tion, space,

and time not as abstracts but as absolute

entities, as things in themselves.

They become

incon-

ceivable not by being logically but by being illogically

developed.

"The

He

says for instance (p. 53):

idea of resistance cannot be separated in thought from

To suppose
the idea of an extended body which offers resistance
that central forces can reside in points not infinitesimally small but
occupying no space whatever points having position only, with
nothing to mark their position points in no respect distinguish-

—
—

—
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able from the surrounding points that are not centres of force
to

suppose
If

this, is utterly

we suppose

beyond human power."

that centres of force existed as math-

forget that our ideas of force and of bodies

To

tension are mere abstractions.
if

and

we

of ex-

think of our ab-

they were things in themselves, ab-

solute existences, will always

COURT.

Mr. Spencer's proposition of the Reconciliation of
is the assurance that science will
leave always an unbounded territory for all kinds of

Science with religion

ematical points separated itom extended bodies,

stract ideas as

;

—

unwarranted assumptions and superstitions, while our
proposition implies the purification of religion from
erroneous notions.
It is the proposition of a great
work to be accomplished.

and necessarily lead us

Things

If

themselves do not exist, they are ghosts.
we try to conceive the nature of ghosts, we shall
in

naturally turn agnostics, but

if

we bear

our ideas have been abstracted from

mind

that

reality, that

they

in

The simplest idea, if we misunderstand it, will become a mystery. And is not perhaps also the great
world-enigma which can never be solved, a mistaken
proposition

are symbols describing certain parts or features of reality,

we

shall

Prof.

soon learn

to

understand that these

ghosts do not exist.
It

would lead us too

far

here to show that Mr.

Spencer's method of making every one of "the

mate

scientific

same.

He

ideas " mysterious

some

tacitly neglects

is

ulti-

throughout the
fundamental

of their

features and upon the whole treats them as if they
ought to be things in themselves. This method of
dealing with the problems of space, time, matter, and
motion will strongly appeal to mystic minds, but it
will not further our insight.
The aim of philosophy
is not to confound our concepts, not to entangle our
minds in hopeless confusion, but to clarify our ideas
and render them precise so that we shall know what

they represent and

The

actual fact

how
is

to

employ them.
knowledge

that a partial

phenomena

tain natural

is

of cer-

the basis of religious ac-

Monists consider the positive element of knowledge as the main thing, while Mr. Spencer on the
contrary eliminates the positive element of knowledge
and retains the negative element of ignorance, the
quintessence of which he calls "the Unknowable,"
oblivious of the fact that in reality there are no such
things as negative magnitudes. While Monism leads to
the formulation of a religion of Science, Mr. Spencer's
conception of religion is the acquiescence in the Unknowable.
Our conception of God is the recognition
of that power to which we have to conform, and our
knowledge of it increases with the progress of science,
while Mr. Spencer's idea of God is the Unknowable.

tion.

It is just

that which

as erroneous for a philosopher to extract

we do not know

dancy

it

our aspirations the curse of vanity.

?

W.

of Physical

K. Clifford in his lecture on "Theories

Forces" endeavors

of the question

to explain the redun-

"why?"

in science.

Science

must be so. Given
one moment of the world-process, and we can calculate the next following or any other one with certainty
we can say that it must be such or such a state of
things.
But the "why?" of things, he says, does not
teaches that

and that

so

is

it

it

:

the range of science, for the question has no

in

lie

We should prefer to say, The tracing of the
"that "is the only legitimate conception of the "why?"

sense.

Clifford's proposition is directed against

philosophers to

ical

whom

there

is

a

metaphys-

"why?"

of facts,

world at large, or as it
is sometimes expressed "a First Cause."
Clifford's
conception of the " why ?" and the "that," it appears
to us, is simply the denunciation of the so-called
great world-enigma as a sham problem which has no
that

to say, a reason for the

is

Knowledge means

sense.

a representation of facts in

mental symbols and comprehension means a unification or harmonious systematisation of these symbols.
At any rate we have to start with facts. As soon, however, as we attempt to start with nothing and hope by

some

sleight of

hand

to create facts or to evolve

out of non-existence,

we

them

are confronted with an in-

Yet the proposition of this
world-problem can bear no close investigation.. It
rests upon a misstatement of the case, for the very de-

solvable world-problem.

mand

to

produce positive facts out of nothing, is itself
is as absurd as the idea of a First or

contradictory and

Ultimate Cause.

The

as the quintessence of re-

would be for a chemist to extract
all those substances of a body which it does not contain and to consider them as the real thing.
The negative magnitude of the not-yet known is,
as all mere possibilities must be, infinite. If this negative magnitude were indeed a positive existence and
the essential thing in religion, it would dwarf all progress into insignificance and would stamp upon all
ligious belief, as

THE WORLD-ENIGMA OF A FIRST CAUSE.

III.

into contradictions.

idea of a

first

cause rests upon a confusion of

d'etre." A first cause
because every cause is the effect of a
former cause, but we may conceive of an ultimate

the terms

cannot

"cause" and " raison

exist,

raison d'etre.
is

formulated

laws,

if

Every raison
in

they were

all

known and

form one great system

means

d'etre of a natural process

a natural law and

of

these natural

laws which can serve as a

of orientation in this world.

of these laws,

all

investigated, would

The most general

being the most comprehensive statement

THE OPKN COURT
of facts,

would be the ultimate

raison d' c/re or

of the world.

The

legitimate but the idea of a " First

is

A

spurious.

First

Cause

is

Cause"

inscrutable indeed, not

because it is so profound an idea that "it passes all
comprehension," but simply because it is a self-contradictory and nonsensical idea.

THE NATURE OF KNOWLEDGE.

IV.

My

reply to Mr. Thurtell

a great extent also a

is to

reply to Dr. Lewis G. Janes.

I

am

glad to see that

he also abandons the idea of an absolutely unknowable,
of

something that

still

is

unknowable per

se,

but

I

find

him

entangled in a strange misconception of the na-

ture of knowledge.

know
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a description of facts, but not an in-

is

terpretation of the description.

idea of an ultimate ground or raison d'etre of

the world
is

Knowledge

ground

He

maintains, that

we cannot

the innermost, the intrinsic, the essential nature

Certain facts are depicted in mental symbols, they stand for and repre-

The

sent these facts.

simplest of these mental sym-

bols are sense-impressions of certain forms, called sen-

Through a comparison of sensations and with
the help of abstraction other mental symbols of a
sations.

higher degree are formed which represent realities in
terms of form, so that the things or processes can be
represented with objective exactness in definite numbers by measuring and counting. But even these symbols, the abstract concepts of science, remain a simple
description of facts.

knowledge

not clear to

It is

these

to

elements attached to the concept

additional

knowledge can we be led

to the belief in an unknowDr. Janes declares, that " the recognition of this

and challenges me to define it. I must confess that I do not know what Dr. Janes means by innermost, intrinsic, and essential nature of reality and if
he uses these words it is an unfair demand on his part
to ask me for an explanation.
Dr. Janes says, "the philosophical agnostic

able.

that reality can only be known indiby and through the interpretation of thoughtsymbols." This he says, after having stated my poIt comes
sition as if it were essentially the same.
very near our position 3'et it differs from it in two im-

a mental abstract to represent

of reality

.

recognises

.

.

.

.

.

rectly

portant points.

We

say, the representation of reality

thought-symbols is knowledge. There is nothing
indirect about it, nor is there any further interpretation of the thought-symbols needed.
in

If we speak for instance of reality in general we
mean those features of reality which are common to
all real things. The term reality in so far as it is most

symbolism constituting the very nature

fact (viz., of

our knowledge)

is

sophical agnosticism.

Cognition

is

possible only through limitation.

organs of limitation
of effect of reality

upon our

knowledge which

is

knowledge,

Man

sible.

are so

metal.

All the diverse qualities of iron

many features of the innermost nature of this
The most general term "matter" is as a mat-

ter of course the least definite.

It is a

mistake based

upon a misconception of the functions of our thoughtsymbols to expect that the most general terms shall

The
contain an explanation of the world-problem.
term "reality" means nothing but actual being and
cannot give us any information about the innermost
nature of being. If we speak of reality as a whole, we
cannot at the same time speak of the particular qualities of reality, because these particular qualities have

been purposely excluded, and I see no use in forming
a concept which shall at the same time be most gen-

and indefinite and yet reveal all the definite details, thus defining at once the innermost, essential,
eral

and

intrinsic nature of reality as a whole.

To demand

a

Certainly

a finite being.

!

And

the nature

knowledge is always finite and limited. But
knowledge is possible wherever a sentient being faces
reality and is affected by reality.
To be omnipresent
is most certainly impossible to a limited being.
Exactly so and not otherwise is it impossible to be omof his

niscient, that

know

to

is,

also

in its

;

sensibility.

independent of the conditions of
to demand something which is impos-

is
is

All our senses are

it.

every sense represents one kind

;

than the term metal.

at the

We

confine our attention to one particular feature, and form

parts of reality with which

is

of

the irrefragable foundation of philo-

same time most empty it is bare of
contents, it is in its kind the most vague and the least
The term iron is more definite
definite of concepts.
general

my mind why

be called indirect or an interpretation
of thought-symbols. It appears to me that only through
is

But

contact.

declares that

all

we do

not

it

in actual

constitution."

means Reality in
means the nature of reality,

Reality per se

itself,

and

reality

or reality consid-

Dr. Janes says: " Finite minds can-

ered objectively.

know

come

does not imply, as Dr. Janes
does, " the Unknowability of Reality

this truth

immanent

in itself

the details of those

Since all minds are
minds being as impossible as immaterial
matter, this means " Reality per se is unknow;ible."
The gist of the footnote on p. 2949 seems to be, "Reality is so utterly unknowable that the human mind
cannot even know that it is unknowable." What a
bottomless abyss If that were so, man would have to
not

the nature of Reality."

finite, infinite

:

!

cease thinking.
v.

THE UNKNOWABLE, THE IDEA OF AN INDEPENDENT
EXISTENCE OF THE SOUL, AND SPOOKISM.

That mind and motion are not convertible terms, is
far as we know was set forth

an old idea which so

THE OPEN
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for the first time with philosophical precision

by Spi-

has been maintained by Locke and by Leibnitz and is the main foundation of modern psychology
since Weber and Fechner, represented at present by
noza.

It

Wundt

Germany and Ribot

found
among the English psychologists a staunch defender
But it was strangely nein George Henry Lewes.
glected by Mr. Herbert Spencer. Professor Fiske succeeded in converting Mr. Spencer on this subject and
this change of opinion alone, it appears to me, would
necessitate Mr. Spencer's recasting his entire psychology.* It now needs Dr. Janes to convert Mr. Spencer
to the idea that agnosticism does not involve any
"mystery," and we should be highly pleased if he
in

France.

in

It

succeeded as well as Professor Fiske.
Mr. Wakeman has with reference to the unknowable spoken about spookism and mysticism, and Dr.
Janes

calls

him

a spook-raiser.

Dr. Janes adds concerning agnosticism
"There is no mystery or metaphysics or 'supernatural:

'

'

'

'

ism

involved in

'

it

whatever."

who speaks not only

of mystery but actually abounds
such expressions as transcendent mystery, absolute
mystery, utterly inscrutable, incomprehensible, unin

The

realities.

in

economy

practical

life,

is

in

most recommendable
science, and also in

style.
Would it not be quite an improveMr. Spencer's writings if he dropped throughout the term "Unknowable" confining himself only to
state that which is known. Take for instance the passage quoted and objected to by Professor Fiske.
Mr. Spencer says
The same, unencum-

matters of

ment

in

:

bered with "the Unknow-

Those modes of the Unknowable which we call motion, heat,
light,

chemical,

affinity,

able":

etc.,

ical,

and into those modes of
the Unknowable which we disother,

affinity,

chem-

light,

etc.,

are

alike

transformable into each other

and

tinguish as sensation, emotion,

into

sensation,

emotion,

thought, f

thought.

not this simplify Mr. Spencer's ideas and

render his positive propositions more concise?
Agnosticism has not freed the world from the ghosts
of metaphysicism, and cannot conquer supernaturalism, although it has confessedly nothing to do with

them

:

it

lets

them

alone.

They

the realm of the unknowable.
pears,

is

very impetuous

in

live a safe life

Mr. Wakeman,

his nature,

his zeal in persecuting the ghosts of

comparison with the ghosts

in

I

of the old times

see, nevertheless, that there

some reason
fessor Fiske who
all

for his
is

after

is

speaking of spookism.

Pro-

so clear concerning the non-inter-

and motion, drops

convertibility of matter

at

once into

same confusion against which he has guarded

the very

himself and others, as soon as he discusses " tran-

He

scendental subjects. "
"

That the

says
Power

:

that animates the universe
must be psychical in its nature, that any attempt to reduce it to
mechanical force must end in absurdity, and that the only kind of
monism which will stand the test of an ultimate analysis is monoInfinite Eternal

theism."

Here

is

a confusion of ideas.

there

If

an In-

is

and Eternal Power at all, it must be convertible
into mechanical force.
If a power cannot be reduced
to mechanical force, we should not call it power
and
if God, the Infinite Something, the Infinite Unknowfinite

;

not at the same time mechanical force but

able, is

purely psychical in his nature,

how can he produce

— supposing that there

is no corbetween the

relation (as Professor Fiske maintains)

psychical and motion.*
the subject here,

it is

I

do not intend

to discuss

sufficient to point out that Pro-

and of God is still
from the positive world-conception of Monism,
and Professor Fiske's view cannot be said to be free
from what in my mind appears as fantastic notions.
The expression that "the psychical activities do
fessor Fiske's view of the psychical

not enter into the circuit, but stand outside of

segment

of a circle

may

as a

it,

stand outside of a portion of

an entire circumference with which it is concentric "
admits of a transcendental explanation, as if the psy-

mo-

chical could exist independent of the circuit of

And

tions.

there are passages in Professor Fiske's

it

in

ap-

and granting

by-gone ages

believes in a transcendent psychical existence, a spirit

which is not motion, a soul-being which has nothing
to do with mechanical force.
The psychical, in our
opinion, is an abstract idea just as much as motion;
it

And

represents a certain quality of real things.

the idea of

some purely psychical

infinite, is in

a ghost.

being, be

our opinion a thing in

Indeed, that

is

itself,

glad to learn that this
the

subject,

but

is

it

finite

or

a chimera,

the kind of ghost in the

limited and proper sense of the word.

We

most

shall

be

not Professor Fiske's view of

we must

confess

that

his

words

strongly suggest this interpretation of his philosophy.

Professor Fiske says in his

"Cosmic Philosophy"

to
(ii,

*

tame

works which corroborate Mr. Wakeman's idea that he

Motion, heat,

are alike transformable into each

Would

are

of witchcraft,

different

principle of

everywhere,

be exaggerated, granted that the ghosts of agnosticism

the world of motion

This does not agree with Mr. Spencer's own words,

knowable

COURT.

To

replace the phrase " nervous shock " by " psychical shock " as Prof.
Fiske proposes, will not do, tor according to Prof. Fiske himself the psychical
is outside the circuit of motions, and shocks are
to be counted as mechanical.
"A psychical shock " would be a contradictio iti adjecto.
t Concerning my exposition that sensation and thought are not and cannot
be transformed motion, Dr. Janes says (p. 21)48) that it " admirably expresses
the idea of Mr. Spencer." Why does Mr. Spencer then say just the opposite ?

p. 445):
" But while the materialistic hypothesis

doomed,

it is

is thus irretrievably
otherwise with the opposing spiritualistic hypothesis."

* Force is mass multiplied by acceleration, and power is the ability to do
work. Work is force acting through a distance. Both concepts serve special
purposes in mechanics. Prof. Fiske apparently uses the word either in a popular or a metaphysical sense where it may mean anything.

"
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find
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some

theses for the session of the Brook-

lyn Ethical Association in answer to the request of Mr. Skilton.

:

"It

COURT.

does not entitle us to deny that soul
some such independent existence."
[science]

With kind regards

may have

Yours

truly,

Ernst Haeckel.
Professor Fiske does not deny his theological bias
and transcendental tendencies. He says
:

"As

The
Mr.

enclosure reads as follows

J. A. Sti/loii. Cor. Sec. of

Dear Sir

regards the theological implications of the doctrine of

The Brooklyn

Ethical Association.

Wakeman

thank you and Mr.

I

:

;

cordially for hav-

I have never undertaken to speak for Mr. Spencer
on
such transcendental subjects it is quite enough if one speaks for
oneself. ... I do not pretend that my opinion in these matters is

ing kindly sent

susceptible of scientific demonstration."

You wish me to send you some theses for your discussion
on the doctrine of evolution its scope and influence, which is proposed to take place on May 31st. I have expressed my views on this

evolution,

;

Professor Fiske's view

is at

with Mr. Spencer's view.
Mr. Spencer's philosophy
not monotheism, but the possibility of monotheism
not excluded.

He

says in his First Principles (p.

subject at length in the last (the eighth) edition of

mental theses,

Though

is

works.

I

do indeed allege that though the Ultimate Cause of
yet incumbent upon us to

assert

these

may perhaps

my "Natural

the following points as funda-

be worthy of special emphasis

:

general doctrine of evolution appears to be already

unassailably established.

Thereby every supernatural creation

2.

is

completely ex-

cluded.

attributes.

Transformism and The Theory

3.

the forms of our consciousness are such that the .\bsolute

of Descent are inseparable

constituents of the Doctrine of Evolution.

any manner or degree be brought within them, we are
nevertheless told that we must represent the Absolute to ourselves
under these forms. As writes Mr. Mansel, in the work from which
I have already quoted largely
'It is our duty, then, to think of
God as personal and it is our duty to believe that He is infinite.'
cannot

The

1.

it

However

History of Creation."

things cannot really be thought of by us as having specified attributes,

my

glad to see that the Brooklyn Ethical Association takes so lively
in the progress of Monism and Transformism in Ger-

an interest

108):

"Some

the essay of the latter concerning

many.

least not incompatible

is
is

am

me

in

The

4.

of

—

necessary conclusion of this proposition

man from

the descent

is

a series of vertebrates (Anthropogeny).

The belief in "an immortal Soul" and in "a personal
God " are therewith completely incompatible (I'd/lig itn-

5.

;

"That
be

said.

this

be any meaning

duty requires us neither

to affirm

in

nor deny personality."

quires us neither to affirm nor to deny "

Prof. Ernst Haeckel, Jena.

perhaps not
spookism itself, but is the soil on which any kind of
spookism can prosper. Agnosticism gives to the ghosts
of metaphysics and theology the right patent to exist.

We

is

to wage a war of words and should
we could come to an understanding

do not wish
if

with Mr. Spencer and the Spencerian agnostics.
But
this understanding, so far as I can see, can only be
arrived at by agnosticism dropping

some

of those fea-

which Mr. Spencer himself has made most prominent
especiallj' the idea of the unknowable as being
an absolute mystery and utterly inscrutable. And this
idea it appears to me is based on a vague notion that
knowledge is something more than a mere description
tures

—

of facts in

mental signs.

Ernst Haeckel.

the foregoing arguments,

The doctrine that nothing can be known about
these so-called transcendental subjects, that " duty re-

be very glad

Very respectfully yours,

vereinbar).

not the conclusion here adopted, needs hardly

is

If there

p.

c.

PROFESSOR HAECKEL'S MONISM AND THE IDEAS
GOD AND IMMORTALITY.
Four Letters prof, ernst haeckel to mr. t. b.

My Dear
man, of

New

Professor

:

I

just received

from Mr. T. B. Wake-

He

York, your letter and theses.

publish the letter and

am

requests

me

to

do so with your permission,
but I should like to have a few words of explanation from you.
The fifth thesis discards the immortality of the soul and the
idea of a personal God. You confess monism but you identify the
latter on the one hand with Goethe's and Spinoza's pantheism, on
the other hand with Lange's and Biichner's materialism.
In my
opinion Goethe's pantheism is radically different from Biichner's
materialism I am ready to accept the former but I cannot adopt
the latter.
Materialism as I understand the term attempts to explain everything from force and matter.
Goethe would never
have considered sensations or thoughts as material things. By
I

willing to

-

;

monism
of

man

I
is

understand solely the unity of the universe.
a certain abstraction

which

exists in connection

The

soul

with his

the body of man is another abstraction and matter is by no
means an exhaustive or all-comprehensive concept. According to
my conception of monism there can be no bodiless soul, but soul

body

;

;

for that reason

is

neither matter nor force but an abstraction sui

generis.

Like you I consider the personality of God as scientifically
untenable, yet the existence of God appears to me indubitable as
soon as we understand by it Nature, in so far as it is not a chaos
but one law-regulated whole, the cognition of which is the basis

The God-idea

of our ethical actions.

in this sense

is

the corner-

stone of what might be called natural religion, the religion of

:

wakeman.

prof. ernst haeckel to mr. j. a. skilton.
dr. paul carus to prof. ernst haeckel.
prof. ernst haeckel to dr. paul carus.*

morality, or the religion of science.

anyone would

call this

used to calling

it

If

Mr. Th. B. U'akeman, 93 Nassau St., New York City.
My Dear Mr. Wakeman My heartiest thanks for your s/'/eiidid essay on my studies and also for the sympathy you extend to

feels,

me.

To

:

* Translated

from the German.

I

conception of

should have no objection

God

atheistic theism.

by personality of the soul

unity of a mystical soul-being,
the personality of God.

but the feeling

exist,

if

am

The
itself

to be understood the supposed
should deny it just as much as

is

I

soul

is

not an ego which thinks and

and the thinking

discuss the immortality of an ego-entity

does not

I

entheism.

but

it

is

is

itself

are the soul.

senseless because

it

different with regard to the soul as being the

:

THK OPKN
The

COURT.
— either monistic or dualistic as represented in the

form

sistent logic

which we feel and think is transferable by heredity and education. There is a transference of the soul beyond death in this sense,

lowing table

thinking itself and

feeling

itself.

soul being that special

in

and the conception of this immortality is not only a
but also of an incalculable practical importance.

Each

individual souls or ego-entities.

There are no

soul consists of a system of

ideas and sensations which have reference to

world.

scientific truth

the

surrounding

ideas of the soul are not the product of the activity

The

of the individual but of

human

society.

Man becomes man

through

humanity which lives in him, the soul in this sense is a spiritual treasure which is transmitted from generation to generation
and continues to live. The immortality of the soul, that is, the
immanent immortality is the condition of evolution.
the

When

our ancestors spoke of the immortality of the soul,

The hope
they obeyed the natural impulse of self-conservation.
of this self-conservation is no delusion if it is but rightly understood. Certainly an ego-entity as

which the soul was considered

in

former times cannot be preserved and we need not mind that.
The grandeur and the beauty of a human soul, that is, the humanity in man, that which in reality the soul is, cognition of truth, together with human ideals are preserved even beyond the death of
the individual, and they will be preserved so long as the conditions of the existence of humanity remain upon. earth.

These ideas are neither purely speculative nor are they fanThe spiritual life of man, the evolution of ethical ideals

tastical.

included, are just as well an object of exact science as are the
In considering the
physical and the natural of human nature.

phenomena

of the spiritual

domain of

life

we must be

just as care-

our terms as in physiology or in any other branch of the
I know that you in spite of all the concentranatural sciences.
ful

in

which you devote yourself to specialties have preserved a
for philosophical and ethical questions, and you have
pronounced your sympathy with the world-conception represented
in 77/1.' Open Court : therefore I wish you would give to your theses
an interpretation that cannot be misunderstood. A few words of explanation concerning the points mentioned will be welcome.
In the hope that it shall again be permitted me to meet you
tion with

warm interest

personally.

I

remain with kind regards.

Yours respectfully,
Paul Carus.
Dr. Paul

Citrus,

it would have been my duty
you for sending me your highly
interesting work "The Soul of Man," and secondly to answer the
objections which you make in your letter of June loth against
several features of my monistic conception. However, I have had
eight months of trial and labor behind me, first through the long
and dangerous sickness of my wife who is now well again, and then
through the revision of my " Anthropogeny," which will presently
Having ceased
be completed. A tremendous amount of work
work for twelve years in this province I had to read hundreds of
essays, to recast thousands of sentences or to replace them by
I can only complete such a great and difficult task by
others.

My Dear

Sir

to write to you.

:

Long

ere this

First to thank

!

doing it at one stroke in a relatively short time to the neglect of
everything else, and I hope that the book in its revised form will
be more valuable than before. Many of your questions are an-

swered

in

it.

seems to me that your monistic world-conception agrees
Apparent differences rest, as is
with mine in all essential points.
often the case in philosophy, upon misconceptions or upon a difYour
God
and
your iiiniiortalily are also mine,
ference of definition.
but the mass of mankind wants above all their personal ego immortality, and everything else stands in second rank.
According to my conception, everything individual or personal
It

is

a passing

phenomenon

systems are according

to

of the world-evolution.

my

conception

—

if

All philosophical

worked out with con-

Monism.

fol-

